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Abstract In this paper I show that Proclus is an adherent of the Classical Model of
Science as set out elsewhere in this issue (de Jong and Betti 2008), and that he adjusts
certain conditions of the Model to his Neoplatonic epistemology and metaphysics. In
order to show this, I develop a case study concerning philosophy of nature, which, des-
pite its unstable subject matter, Proclus considers to be a science. To give this science
a firm foundation Proclus distills from Plato’s Timaeus the basic concepts Being and
Becoming and a number of basic propositions, among others the quasi-definitions of
the basic concepts. He subsequently explains the use of these quasi-definitions, that
are actually epistemic guides, in such a way that he obtains a connection between a
rational and an empirical approach to the natural world. A crucial task in establishing
the connection is performed by the faculty of doxa and by geometrical conversion.
The result is that Proclus secures a universal, necessary and known foundation for all
of philosophy of nature.
Keywords Proclus · Philosophy of nature · Science
1 Introduction
In his seminal article ‘The ancient axiomatic theory’, Scholz states that Aristotle, in
producing a first general description of exact science in the Posterior analytics did such
a marvellous job that “after his time, we may say, antiquity added nothing new to it”.
This judgment, he continues, echoes one passed by Proclus (411–485 AD), “the last
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competent interpreter among the ancients”.1 Unfortunately, Scholz does not refer to
any particular passage in Proclus’ works. Regardless, however, of what he had in mind,
let us juxtapose his echo with the following words of the Neoplatonic philosopher:
the analytic method of the Peripatos, and its chief component, demonstration, is
easy to apprehend and crystal-clear to everyone who is not entirely dizzy, and
groggy from the water from the river Lethe. (In Crat. 2.10–2.13)2
Expressions such as ‘easy to apprehend’ and ‘crystal-clear’ are appreciative enough.
But the addition of ‘dizziness’ and ‘water from the river Lethe’, the source of oblivion
from which the souls drink before their incarnation,3 reveals that instead, Proclus is
here criticising Aristotle’s method of demonstration as set out in the Analytics by
putting it down as a method for simple minds: it is stripped of content,4 and anyone
can understand it. This impression is reinforced by the context. Proclus is comparing
the logic or dialectic of Aristotle to that of Plato, and the latter is considered superior
by far, since it ultimately studies the highest principle, the Good, and is suitable only
for those with a purified and properly trained faculty of reason (In Crat. 1.12–2.1).
Proclus’ critical stance towards Aristotle’s Analytics can in part be explained as
rhetoric. Proclus, who writes eight centuries after Aristotle’s Posterior analytics, is
a Platonist who is convinced that Aristotle and Plato could be harmonised, because
Aristotle was a Platonist,5 and that, in case of disagreement, Aristotle should be the
one to be criticised. If the methods of Aristotle and Plato were to be compared at all,
Plato’s would always be considered to contain everything we find in Aristotle, except
for the mistakes.6
In light of the theme of this issue, this paper will stick to the method for the
simple minds, and study Proclus’ views of scientific method, which he himself dubs
‘geometrical methods’. Since O’Meara’s important monograph Pythagoras Revived
it is commonly accepted that the attribute ‘geometrical’ in this context has little to do
with mathematization in the modern sense, and that the role of geometry is limited to
providing a paradigm (O’Meara 1989, p. 182).
What has not been adequately realised is that to a great extent that paradigm follows
the Classical Model of Science as described in the introduction of this issue (see de
Jong and Betti 2008), and that likewise Proclus’ ‘geometrical method’ follows that
Model as found in the first systematic account of it: Aristotle’s organon (plus the
1 Scholz (1930/1975, p. 50).
2 In fact, Scholz may have had these very words in mind. I was unable to find any other reference to
Aristotle’s scientific theory that even came close to Scholz’ words.
3
“To suffer from dizziness or vertigo” is used by Plato (Theaet. 155C, Laws 633B, cf. ib. 892E and Soph.
264C) to indicate a situation of complete confusion caused by the complexity of an argument.
4 Cf. ibid. 1.11. Cf. Plot. Enn. I.3.5.8–I.3.13.
5 This position may sound strange to our ears that are so accustomed to the opposition of Plato to Aristotle,
but in late antiquity it was well established. Moreover, recently it has gained more popularity. Cf. Gerson
(2005).
6 Cf. Alcinous who, as Dillon (1993, p. xvi) has shown, manages to incorporate a great deal of Aristotelian
(and Stoic) doctrine into this handbook, without identifying it as such, and while remaining Platonic in
essence.
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ensuing commentary tradition),7 and its first strict application: Euclid’s Elements.8
A thorough analysis of the influence of those works on Proclus’ ideal of science has
yet to be undertaken.9
In this paper, I will discuss Proclus’ adherence to the Classical Model of Science.
After a brief general survey of the Model (Sect. 2) I present a case study, concerning
philosophy of nature (physiologia). The main thesis of this paper is that Proclus adopts
the Model, adapts it to his Neoplatonic metaphysics and uses it to show that philosophy
of nature is a science. This will be illustrated by focusing on the role that three of the
conditions of the Model play in Proclus’ physiologia: condition 2a, that in a science
S there is a number of fundamental concepts, condition 5, that all propositions of S
are necessary in some sense, and condition 7, that the concepts and propositions are
adequately known.10
2 Proclus and the Model
Although Proclus, like so many other adherents of (versions of) the Model (see de
Jong and Betti 2008), did not write a separate theory of science, detailed information
on the theory he uses can be gathered from applications and explicit discussions of
elements of the Model.
First of all, some of his systematic works contain clear applications of components
of the Model, as they are presented as demonstrations more geometrico. The best
known and most influential work of Proclus generally taken as an example of such an
application is his Elements of Theology, an exposition of the basic principles of Neo-
platonic metaphysics. As has been pointed out by several scholars, however, despite
their name the Elements of Theology are essentially different from Euclid’s Elements.
The former are presented as a deduction from the first proposition ‘Every plurality
partakes in some way in unity’, followed by a demonstration and ensuing proposi-
tions, but the demonstrations are not preceded by definitions, postulates and axioms.11
A work that is closer to Euclid’s Elements in this sense is the Elements of Physics,
which is based on a selection of passages from Aristotle’s Physics, concerning motion
and the unmoved mover, presented as a sequence of propositions plus demonstrations,
this time preceded by definitions (cf. Nikulin 2003).
The disadvantage of the systematic works for our purposes, is that they are pure
presentations of scientific knowledge, which do not also ascend to a meta-level and
theorize about the principles underlying that presentation.
7 Hathaway (1982, p. 124) names only the Pythagoreans, Zeno, Plato, and Euclid as sources for Proclus’
ideas of scientific method.
8 This is not to say, of course, that Aristotle’s description or Euclid’s practice of scientific knowledge
correspond exactly to the Model, or that the Model is not to be found in Stoic or Platonic context.
9 The same goes for other Platonic philosophers, whose Aristotelian heritage has only recently become the
subject of closer study. For Plotinus see e.g. de Haas (2001); Chiaradonna (2002), Longo (2006, esp. II);
for Syrianus see Longo (2005).
10 Space does not allow me to go into Proclus’ use of the other conditions of the Model.
11 For more arguments against the thesis that Proclus’ Elements of Theology are the first Western attempt
at an axiomatization of metaphysics, see O’Meara (1989, 196 ff), O’Meara (2000, pp. 285–286), Hathaway
(1982, pp. 123–124), Lowry (1980), Lohr (1986, pp. 59–60).
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The second source of information on Proclus’ adherence to the Model can be
found in remarks on methodology and prerequisites of scientific knowledge, which
are present to some degree in each of his commentaries, but especially in the commen-
tary on the first book of Euclid’s Elements. The double prologue of this commentary is
devoted to a discussion of the nature of mathematics and geometry respectively, and in
part amounts to an explicit formulation of an ideal of (those) science(s). Of the com-
mentaries on Platonic dialogues, that on the Timaeus is the most valuable for our pur-
poses. Here, as in the other commentaries, we are offered a combination of discussions
and applications of components of his scientific method. But what is more, Proclus’
views on philosophy of nature form an interesting case-study regarding his version of
the Model, due to the strained relation between nature and science in Platonism.
3 The case of philosophy of nature
Today, the natural sciences are considered the paradigm of science. For Plato, however,
and all Platonic philosophers after him (i.e. any later philosopher adhering to some
version of his views), the object of true scientific knowledge was not the ever-changing
natural world, but rather the eternal world of transcendent Forms. The most famous
description of the unreliability of studies of the natural world is without doubt the one
we find in Plato’s own cosmological account (Timaeus 29C4–29C8).
Proclus, nonetheless, delivers a Commentary on the Timaeus that defends the pos-
sibility of scientific knowledge of the natural world,12 while at the same time maintai-
ning a thoroughly Platonic position on the essential instability of that world. And it is
exactly this combination of a subject matter that defies certainty on the one hand and
a defence of the possibility of scientific knowledge of that subject matter on the other,
that provides us with a clear view of what constitutes a science according to Proclus,
and hence of his version of the Model.
Proclus finds the material on which he bases his defence in the proœmium of Plato’s
Timaeus, i.e. the introduction Timaeus gives to his exposition on the universe.13 It is a
description of the starting points, i.e. the primitive concepts and propositions of all of
physiologia. Before we can move on to the details of the defence, a summary of those
starting points, following Proclus’ division of them, is in order.
3.1 Outline of the proœmium of the Timaeus
I. Being and Becoming14
The first starting point is the distinction between the transcendent realm of Forms
which is known through understanding combined with a rational account (Being),
12 See also Festugière (1963), O’Meara (1989, esp. 179 ff) and Lernould (2001).
13 Plato Tim. 27C1–29D3, with Proclus’ commentary at In Tim. I.204–I.354. For the sake of clarity: in the
following I will discuss Proclus’ reading of Plato’s Timaeus (Tim.), as presented in his Commentary on the
Timaeus (In Tim.).
14 I use capitals for ‘Being’ and ‘Becoming’ whenever they are used as nominalizations referring to realms
of Platonic reality, rather than the present continuous of to be and to become respectively.
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and the realm of generation which is grasped by belief (doxa)15 combined with sense
perception (Becoming).
II. The efficient cause of Becoming
The second starting point states that ‘anything Becoming has a(n efficient) cause’. In
the case of the universe as a whole, this cause is referred to as the ‘demiurge’.
III. The paradigmatic cause and the copy
The third starting point assumes that every efficient cause creates with the aid of
a paradigm that is Being or Becoming, and states that the quality of the paradigm
determines the quality of the copy.
IV. Transition to the subject matter, the universe
The three starting points are subsequently applied to the main subject of the exposition,
the universe, in the following manner:
1.* the universe is Becoming, because it is accessible to sense perception
2.* therefore, the universe has an efficient cause, its ‘father’ or ‘maker’
3.* this maker created the universe as the copy of a paradigm that is eternal Being16
And finally,
V. The likely story
The proœmium ends with the well-known principle of the likely story, which states
the dependence of the nature of a text on that of its subject matter. As a text about a
copy (according to 3*), which has a likeness to its model, Timaeus’ story will be a
‘likeness’, a likely story. 17
It has been suggested by modern commentators, albeit with some reservations,
that in this prooemium we find the application of the method Plato describes in the
Phaedo, i.e. a foreshadowing of an (hypothetico-)deductive method.18 One could say
15 On this translation of doxa see footnote 57.
16 Where ‘being created’ is understood in the sense of ‘being ontologically dependent on’, in a non-temporal
sense, and not as creatio ex nihilo.
17 The two pages in which Plato formulates this introduction to his cosmology have raised a great number
of issues from the moment they were written. See Martijn (2006, Sect. II) and Martijn (2008, Ch. V) for
overviews.
18 Runia (1997, pp. 111–112), Vlastos (1975, pp. 28–29), cf. Mourelatos (1991). Vlastos is sceptical:
“The bare logical schema of hypothetico-deductive science can, no doubt, be found in the Timaeus” (1975,
p. 26), but “modern accounts that claim to find in the Timaeus a prefiguring of our hypothetico-deductive
conception of science fail to hear the chuckles of play and irony in Timaeus’ voice” (1975, p. 29).
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that Proclus was the first to make a similar suggestion, and far more resolutely than
modern commentators.19
3.2 Physiologia a science?
In his explanation of the ‘likely story’, the dismissal of physiologia as not presenting
hard facts but probabilities (#V in the outline), Proclus reports that physiologia cannot
be a science for Plato due to the narrow definition of science adopted in the Timaeus.
As in the case of most ancient writers, Plato’s identification of a certain discipline
as scientific is not a rigid designation.20 As Proclus points out, his great predecessor
wields different (cumulative) criteria, according to which a discipline qualifies as a
science:
Plato sometimes defines science (epistêmê) as ‘providing causes’, sometimes as
‘the subject matter also having an entirely permanent essence, on top of giving
account of the causes’, sometimes as ‘the principles not being hypotheses’.21
By the first definition, and only by that one, would physiologia be a science. It could
never be an unhypothetical science, since this is a prerogative reserved for theological
dialectic;22 it can also never be a purely dianoetic science (as are the mathematical
sciences), since the subject matter of physiologia does not have a permanent essence.
The only sense in which philosophy of nature can be a science is by providing the causes
of natural phenomena. By adopting the narrower second definition, Plato reduces
physiologia to a ‘likely story’ (In Tim I.350.12–I.350.20): the mere nature of the
world of sense perception, i.e. Becoming, prevents its constituent propositions to be
strictly universal, necessary (in the ordo essendi or cognoscendi), and known (to be
true).23 The level of cognition that can be attained with regard to nature, according to
the first starting point of the proœmium, is (true) belief, doxa.
19 Although for Proclus there is an important difference between the Timaeus, a didactic text, and the
Phaedo, which describes the method of discovery. Cf. In Parm. 655.16 ff.
20 On Plato’s different divisions of the sciences and forms of cognition Phil. 55c–59c; Statesman 258e–
260b; Rep. 537c and Mourelatos (1991). Like Plato, Proclus does not adhere to one hierarchy of the
sciences. Instead, he presents several divisions, which differ mainly because of their different focus, since
they are tailor-made for particular contexts. The conditions of the Classical Model of Science are always
presupposed, however. See (1) In Eucl. 30.10–32.20, inspired on a combination of Plato’s Divided Line
(Rep. VI 509D ff) and Aristotle’s APo; (2) De Prov. 27–32, inspired on Plato; (3) ibid. 31.10–31.12, Theol.
Plat. and In Eucl. 10.15–11.9, based on the principle that ‘like is known by like’. That the hierarchies are
context-related does not mean that Proclus would deny the validity of any of them outside that context.
For an attempt to turn them into a unified Proclian hierarchy of all sciences and forms of cognition, see
Lernould (1987), cf. Siorvanes (1996, 141 ff).
21 In Tim. I.350.8–I.350.12. These three criteria can be compared to the Postulate of Grounded Knowledge,
the Necessity Postulate, and the Postulate of Knowledge (see de Jong and Betti 2008), which goes to show—
assuming, as I do, that Proclus is right here—that the Classical Model in at least some respects predates
Aristotle.
22 On the position that Proclus’ philosophy of nature does have unhypothetical starting points, see Lernould
(2001).
23 As required by the Model, see de Jong and Betti (2008).
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Fortunately, the judgment of physiologia sketched above is Proclus’ interpretation
of Plato’s stance. Proclus’ own verdict is far less harsh: he follows Plato in adopting
the second definition, yet without thereby disqualifying physiologia as a science.
How then does Proclus guarantee a scientific status for physiologia? First of all,
the proœmium of the Timaeus is analysed in such a way as to summon a scientific
environment for physiologia by fulfilling the Postulate of Order (de Jong and Betti
2008). The Postulate of Order says that a science consists of certain primitive concepts,
from which all other concepts are definable, and fundamental propositions, from with
the other propositions follow. Proclus distinguishes two basic concepts, four basic
propositions, and demonstrations based on these starting points. In doing so, he claims
necessity for the propositions of physiologia.24 Secondly, in his explanation of the first
of those demonstrations Proclus provides us with a short but definitive argument in
favour of accepting physiologia as a science, by ensuring knowability and universality
of the propositions.
4 Basic concepts and propositions
Like any other discipline, physiologia has certain proper starting points that distinguish
it from other disciplines and that are its foundation:
Like a geometer, Plato seems to take up definitions before the demonstrations
and hypotheses, through which he will make the demonstrations, and to lay
down beforehand the foundations of the entire philosophy of nature: for just as
there are different starting points of poetry, of medicine, of arithmetic and of
mechanics, so too are there certain starting points of the entire philosophy of
nature. …From these everything that follows proceeds.25
Even before these definitions and hypotheses, however, the enterprise of philosophy
of nature has its unique starting point in a question: whether the universe has come
into being (In Tim. I.219.21–I.219.22). Everything else, according to Proclus, follows
from that. That is, because of the reply to this question we will know the essence of the
universe, which in turn will have certain consequences.26 In order to answer this first
problêma concerning the universe, we have to understand what it is (not) to have come
into being, in other words, define Being and Becoming (In Tim. I.235.32–I.236.13).
Thus the determination of the essence (eidos) of the universe (276.19–276.21;
226.28) will be reached through an analysis of the two relevant realms of reality,
Being and Becoming. As Plato says,
well then, in my opinion first the following division should be made (diaereteon
tade): what is that which always is, but does not have generation, and what is
that which is (always) becoming, but never really is? (Tim. 27D6–28A1)
24 He presupposes that necessity of the propositions is guaranteed by their following deductively from the
basic propositions that are themselves necessary. Cf. In Tim. I.337.3–I.337.17. Of the four propositions,
only two will be discussed in the following.
25 In Tim. I.236.13 ff. Note that Proclus includes both epistêmai and technai.
26 In Tim. I.219.2–I.219.31, cf. In Tim. I.275–I.276.7.
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Inspired by Plato’s choice of words and by a desire to encounter all dialectical methods
in the proœmium, and in the proper order,27 in first instance Proclus sees applications
of the methods of division (diairesis) and definition in the discussion of these two
realms.28
4.1 The division
Proclus’ scholastic discussion of all possible kinds of division to determine which one
applies, however, ends in discarding the possibility that we are dealing with a division
altogether (In Tim. I.224.17–I.227.3). A real Platonic diairesis, of any type, is a division
of things (entities, qualities etc.) that are on equal level within a taxonomy, be it onto-
logical, semantic or otherwise. Since Being and Becoming are essentially different, in
many respects each other’s contraries, but moreover not on the same ontological level
(as Being is prior to Becoming), a division of these two is impossible.29 Moreover,
there is no genus above Being, which makes it altogether impossible to give a division
in which Being figures.30 According to Proclus, instead of a division Plato is only
making a ‘delimiting distinction’ (diakrisis aphoristikê):31
The division is not of one thing, but the current study needs the distinction of
these two genera before everything else, in order that the exposition proceeds
as from geometrical hypotheses to the examination of the consequences and
discovers the nature and the efficient and paradigmatic causes of everything.
(In Tim. I.226.22–I.227.3)32
According to Proclus, one of the tasks of a good scientist is to distinguish between
different genera and to choose the proper demonstration accordingly, i.e. the one
that uses the starting points fitting to the subject matter and that has the appropriate
epistemological status and degree of certainty.33 In physiologia the distinction of the
27 Of the dialectical methods involved in the synthetic, downward path, i.e. division, definition, and
demonstration, division is considered the most august, and is to be applied first because it provides the
principles of definition, which in turn is the basis of demonstration. Cf. In Parm. 982.11–982.15, Theol.Plat.
I.9.40.10–I.9.40.12, In Parm. 980.33 ff, 981.3, 24, In Eucl. 206.13. Cf. Beierwaltes (1979, p. 248).
28 See Phaedrus (265C–266D), Sophist (216A–232A) and Statesman (258B–268D; 274E-end).
29 Proclus sees a parallel with the distinction of three highest genera in Plato’s Philebus (23C-D).
30 Cf. footnote 49. The fascinating question whether the same holds for Becoming, or whether e.g. it is
instead a species of Being, is not answered by Proclus, and is probably not easily resolved. It will not be
treated here.
31 In Tim. I.225.24–I.226.2. Cf. Proclus’ almost identical comments on Plato Parm. 135B3 (In Parm.
976.26–976.38).
32 Cf. Plotinus, who explicitly rejects Severus’ insertion of a genus ‘something’ above Being and Becoming
as ridiculous. Plotinus moreover makes clear that Plato makes the distinction in the first place in order to
warn those who mistakenly call Being that which is actually Becoming (Plot. Enn. VI.2.1, esp. 21–28).
33 In Eucl. 32.21 ff. Here Proclus mentions the Timaeus as the prime example of a text in which the subject
matter influences the degree of certainty. Cf. In Eucl. 211.23–212.1. This issue is related to the Domain
Postulate of the Model, according to which ‘all propositions and all concepts (or terms) of S concern a
specific set of objects or are about a certain domain of being(s)’. This postulate poses interesting problems
for physiologia. Space does not permit a treatment here, as it would require an extensive discussion of
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genera, i.e. Being and Becoming, allows Timaeus to determine which of these two is
most appropriate to the subject matter, the universe, and hence discover the nature and
causes of the universe from hypotheses and their consequences. Thus in the sense of
preventing error by accurately distinguishing the main terms/concepts relevant within
a science, the diakrisis is no less significant than a diairesis would have been.34
From all this we gather that Being and Becoming are introduced as the primitive
concepts of physiologia (fulfilling condition 2a). This brings us to the question how
these two concepts can, as was announced by Proclus, be defined.
4.2 The definitions
Because the method of division was traditionally related to definition, and because the
sentence introducing the ‘division’ commences with ‘what is…’, ancient readers of
the Timaeus assumed that Plato presents definitions of Being and Becoming.35 Since
a division of the two concepts was impossible, however, and Being and Becoming
are primitive concepts of physiologia, as a consequence, the possibility of giving a
definition is also excluded.36 Not surprisingly, Proclus refers to commentators prior
to him who criticised Plato for not following the rules of defining in presenting those
definitions (In Tim.I.240.13–I.243.2). The two questions ‘what is Being?’ and ‘what
is Becoming?’ are answered as follows:
Eternal Being is what is known through intellect (nous) and reasoning (logos),
and
Becoming is what is judged through belief (doxa) and sense perception
(aisthêsis) (Tim. 28A1–28A4).
In these descriptions, the critics complained, no genus is supplied (as it should be in a
proper definition) and what is worse, the descriptions do not clarify the nature of the
definiendum, but describe it by our epistemological relation to them.37 Proclus, who
responds to these Peripatetic criticisms with fierce indignation, does not simply reject
Footnote 33 continued
Neoplatonic ontological taxonomy. On genera in Neoplatonism see Lloyd (1990, pp. 76–97, cf. pp. 144–
145), Siorvanes (1996, pp. 67–69, 77–81). Cf. ?, pp. 129–130.
34 As was pointed out to me by an anonymous referee, at times Proclus uses diairesis and diakrisis as
synonyms (e.g. Theol.Plat. IV 31 92). In the context of the prooemium, however, Proclus clearly considers
diairesis a narrow technical term, and diakrisis a semantically less pregnant term.
35 Thus In Tim. I.227.13–I.227.18. Cf. In Parm. 982.12–982.13, In Eucl. 57.18–57.26, 69.9 ff where
definitions are coupled with division as the methods ‘with respect to first principles’. Cf. Buzzetti (1997, esp.
pp. 332–336). Cf. Alcinous Didask. V 157.1–V 157.10 (ed. Whittaker). Note, however, that the definitions
given in the Timaeus do not use the ‘genera’ of the division, but are definitions of those ‘genera’ instead.
Cf. Steel (2004).
36 In Parm. 980.29 ff. On the related problem of metaphysics as a discursive science see O’Meara (1986).
37 In Tim. I.241.31–I.242.2, cf. In Tim. III.254.27–III.254.31, where Proclus calls a genuine definition one
that 1. conveys a character that is applicable to all the genera falling under the definition, 2. expounds the
essence of the definiendum, 3. does not include the definiendum in the definiens.
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them, e.g. by referring to the analogy of the Divided Line (Plato Rep. 509D ff.), but
instead meets the critics on their own ground.
(1) He responds to the first objection by pointing out in an extensive discussion
that Being is the highest genus,38 and that Plato could therefore not possibly have
given a proper definition. To indicate that he is merely using the term ‘definition’
in a derivative sense, and that the two answers to the questions ‘what is Being’ and
‘what is Becoming?’ are (merely) similar to definitions, Proclus calls the ‘what’ (ti)
in these questions ‘akin to definition’ (horikon), rather than ‘belonging to definition’
(horistikon), the more common expression.39 The rare term horikon is used by Aristotle
to designate something that is not a standard definition, and does not reveal the essence
(to ti ên einai), but is similar to a definition in that it does express the identity of two
things.40 In this sense, the two cognitive descriptions from the proœmium are indeed
akin to definition. They provide criteria that will allow us to identify (only) Being and
(only) Becoming respectively, because the metaphysical distinction between Being
and Becoming is correlated with that between the intelligible and the sensible.41 That
this correlation is supposed by Proclus, and, in fact, by Plato himself, to exist between
definiendum and definiens is also clear from the fact that an inverted version of the
definition of Becoming is used later as argument in the first demonstration, concerning
the nature of the universe (In Tim I.283.15–I.283.19; 292.19 ff; II.4.4, see Sect. 5).
That demonstration will also show that for the definitions to serve as starting points of
physiologia it is necessary that they be related primarily to the subjective discrimination
by the knower.
Through his explanation of the definitions, Proclus manages to bring in ‘definition’
as another technical term after ‘division’, and then by way of a scholastic discussion
of it dismisses the strictly technical meaning, while retaining the scientific context.
(2) Proclus renders the second point of criticism, that the definitions do not reveal the
nature of the definienda, harmless by emphasising the didactic and anagogic purpose
of both Timaeus’ exposition, and the dialogue as a whole. The ‘definitions’ will be
used later as axioms and hypotheses of the demonstrations, and as such they have
to be known and evident to us (gnôrimous …kai enargeis hêmin),42 in accordance
38 In Tim. I.242.5 ff. The defence relies on Being as including all substance (ousia), potentialities and
actualities. Since substance is ‘most generic’, there can be no genus above Being, which includes substance.
Proclus seems to follow Porphyry (Isag. 4, 1.5.1–1.5.2) and Aristotle (Met. E.1), rather than Plotinus, for
whom ousia is not a genus as it is not predicated synonymously (Enn. VI.1.3), and to on is one of the
five so-called highest kinds (VI.2.8.44–VI.2.8.45, cf. Plato Soph. 254E ff.), although the other four are its
constituent actualities, de Haas (2001, pp. 514–515) and Chiaradonna (2002, pp. 80–81 and Ch. 3, 227 ff.).
Proclus’ focus on Being (as in the case of the ‘division’) is due to the fact that his discussion is part of a
more general defence of Plato’s theory of Forms.
39 In Tim. I.227.13, cf. 309.9–309.13: Plato has “secured eternal Being through the definitory explanation”.
40 Top. I.5, 101b37 ff. Proclus uses the term horikon in a loose sense, as Aristotle’s main point is that a
single word (onoma) cannot be a definition, as a definition should be a proposition (logos). For the proper
use of the term, see Hermias, who says that ‘soul’ can be defined by a ‘horikon onoma’, and shows that it
is in fact an abbreviation of a proposition (In Phaedo 120.6 ff).
41 Cf. Taylor (1928, p. 61) and Zeyl (2000, p. xxviii).
42 I.242.16–I.242.19. Cf. In Tim. I.345.6 ff, II.27.1 ff. Cf. In Tim. I.226.22 ff, the first mention of the use
of hypotheses and demonstrations, but in the context of the ‘division’; I.229.1 ff, on philosophy of nature
being a hypothetical science; or 235.32 ff, on the definitions as first starting points.
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with condition 7 of the Model, which states that all propositions of a science S should
be adequately known (de Jong and Betti 2008). Proclus’ formulation harks back to
Aristotle’s distinction between ‘what is prior and better known to us (gnôrimôteron
hêmin)’ and ‘what is prior and better known by nature’, a distinction made in the
context of the requirements of the starting points of demonstrations,43 and to the very
first lines of the Posterior analytics: “All teaching and all intellectual learning develop
from pre-existing knowledge” (71a1–71a2).
Setting out the starting points, through which “Timaeus wants to make Being and
Becoming familiar”,44 is a preparatory phase before the actual unfolding of science. It
is thus only reasonable that Plato presents the peculiar nature of Being and Becoming
by describing the epistemic access we have of them, which will subsequently result
in anamnêsis, our awakening to a clearer grasp of their nature (In Tim. I.242.26–
I.242.27, cf. In Tim. I.242.19–I.242.21). We now face the question, however, whether
the primary concepts of physiologia can be adequately known.
5 The foundation of philosophy of nature
A necessary consequence of the definition of Becoming and the determination of the
essence of the universe as Becoming, is that the universe is accessible to perception
only, and that Timaeus’ account is a description of belief based on perception. Contrary
to Cornford’s (1937, pp. 24, 29) suggestion, however, this conclusion is not drawn by
Plato.45 More importantly for our concern, Proclus, who interprets the Timaeus as
a scientific treatise, i.e. as epistêmê, has to reconcile that scientific status with the
fact that due to belonging to Becoming rather than Being, the universe cannot be the
subject of epistêmê.
Although obtaining such a reconciliation might seem an impossible task, ensuring
scientific knowability of Becoming and giving physiologia a foundation that is both
empirical and rational does not cause Proclus any trouble. We find his solution in an
elegant analysis of what he calls ‘the first demonstration’. That analysis, containing
two at first sight rather puzzling remarks, makes a highly ingenious use of the concept
of geometrical conversion, the faculty of judgment (doxa),46 and the fundamental
continuity that characterises Neoplatonic reality and knowledge.
43 APo I.2, 71b33 ff, Phys. I 1, 184a16 ff, etc. See Barnes (1994, pp. 96–97) and Mignucci (1975, pp. 30–31)
for more reff.
44 In Tim. I.242.21–I.242.24. I take this to mean that they have cognitive priority prior to the positing,
rather than due to the positing. In the latter case the necessity of prior positing would have no argumentative
force in the defence of the content of the definitions, which is the issue at hand. The audience needs to know
already that it has the different cognitive capacities and respective objects (although their names, ‘Being’
and ‘Becoming’, may be stipulated).
45 The ‘likely story’ is based on the ontological, not the epistemological, status of the universe. On this
paradox of the Timaeus see Martijn (2008, 130 ff).
46 On the translation see below and footnote 67.
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5.1 Geometrical conversion
After the exposition of the basic concepts and propositions of philosophy of nature
the first step in the so-called ‘emanation’, i.e. the demonstrations, is determining the
essence (eidos) of the universe. More precisely, it is the inclusion of the universe in
Becoming:
[The universe] has come to be: for it is visible and tangible and corporeal, and
all such things are perceptible. And everything perceptible, that is, everything
that is apprehended by doxa with the use of sense perception, is Becoming and
generated. (Tim. 28B7–28C2)
According to Proclus this is a syllogism based on a so-called conversion of the
definition of Becoming, which read “Becoming is what is judged through doxa and
perception” (Tim. 28A2–28A4), and such a conversion is typical for geometry:
So it is shown demonstratively that the cosmos has become from the definition,
according to the conversion (epistrophê) of the definition: for geometers also use
such proofs. (In Tim. I.283.15–I.283.18)
Conversion, as a method used in geometry, is the creation of a new theorem B by
exchanging the so-called hypothesis (the if-clause) of a theorem A with its conclusion,
or by changing the relation of predication: if a property is predicated of a genus,
in the converse theorem the genus is predicated of the property.47 In the Timaeus
the definition ‘everything Becoming is perceptible and opinable’ is comparable to a
so-called leading theorem, in which the definiendum Becoming is the genus and the
definiens ‘perceptible and opinable’ the property. “Everything that is apprehended by
doxa with the use of sense perception is Becoming and generated” (Tim. 27C1–27C2),
is like a so-called converse theorem, as the genus there is predicated of the property.
The reference to geometrical practice above is intended as a justification of the use
of conversion (cf. the conjunction ‘for’), but it may not seem the most appropriate
justification in the context, as geometrical conversion pertains to theorems, not defi-
nitions. Why doesn’t Proclus refer to the Stoic conversion of definitions (also called
antistrophê, SV.II.226), or to Aristotelian logical conversion?48 According to Anti-
pater (Stoic scholarch at Athens in the second century BC), a definition should be
an identity statement, and hence convertible. We can safely assume that this require-
ment is implicit in Proclus’ discussion of the definition of Becoming, as an identity
statement is also what Proclus is assuming here. If the definition were not an identity
47 Proclus refers to Euclid El. prop. 5 and its converse 6: “every isosceles has the angles at the base equal”
and “if a triangle has the angles at the base equal, then it also has the sides subtending to the base equal and is
isosceles” (the switch from categorical to hypothetical is irrelevant to his point). Festugière rightly remarks
that Proclus does not speak of conversion of definitions in the In Eucl., but what Proclus has in mind here is
the so-called conversion (antistrophê) of theorems (In Eucl. 251.23 ff, cf. Heath 1956, pp. 256–257). The
use of the far more common, but inappropriate epistrophê instead of antistrophê can be explained as a slip
either on Proclus’ side or of a scribe’s. In the second discussion of the converted definition of Becoming
Proclus does use the verb antistrephein (In Tim. II.4.4 ff, ad Tim. 31B).
48 Stoic conversion is a topic in logical theory of the Aristotelian commentators, starting with Alex. Aphr.
(e.g. In Metaph. 531, In Top. 241 etc.).
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statement, the conversion would be invalid. Proclus is not too forthcoming, however,
in acknowledging Stoic influences. Moreover, a disadvantage of Stoic conversion is
that it concerns equivalence relations between definiendum and definiens, but not the
actual procedure of swapping them in reasoning, which is what Proclus needs.
That he does not use Aristotelian syllogistic conversion, which is a procedure, is
because such a logical conversion is too weak for Proclus’ purposes: in the proœmium,
Plato assumes equivalence and converts a universal affirmative proposition into a
universal affirmative proposition. In logical conversion, however, the converse is
never a universal affirmative proposition. Therefore we need strong, i.e. geometri-
cal conversion.49
Proclus understood very well that the success of Plato’s reasoning in the proœmium
depends to a large extent on the convertibility of some of the starting points,50 and
he uses his paradigm of the geometrical method to summon a context in which such
convertibility is common.
5.2 Doxa as middle term: the first puzzle
Proclus labels Plato’s procedure admirable and scientific (epistemonikôs), because,
through the conversion, he gives the definition the function of a middle term, ‘as one
should do in demonstrations’:
For in the hypotheses he defined the generated as ‘judgeable’ (doxaston), but for
the demonstration of the [universe’s] being generated he assumed the converse
(i.e. ‘the judgeable is generated’, MM), so that he made a middle term of the
definiens. (In Tim. I.292.22 ff)
The definiens of the original definition, i.e. doxaston, is a middle term in the syllogism
“all that is judgeable is generated; the world is judgeable; therefore the world is
generated” (cf. In Tim. I.296.20–I.296.21).51 Thus from a purely formal point of view
one could say that the term doxaston allows for the conclusion to be drawn. But Proclus
does not credit only the formal role of the definiens in arriving at the knowledge that
the world is generated. In his analysis of the converted definition Proclus consistently
leaves out the second term of the definiens, aisthêton. This exclusion of perception
is not due to sloppiness, but is a deliberate choice. Proclus continues his analysis as
follows:
Because the faculty of judgment (doxa) possesses the rational principles (logoi)
of things that are generated, it obtains the position of the cause with respect
to them. That is why, I think, Plato is not satisfied with ‘being perceptible’ in
order to designate the generated, but adds that it is also ‘judgeable’ (doxaston),
since perception knows the activities of the objects of perception because it is
49 On fallacious conversion, in which equivalence is wrongly presupposed, see In Eucl. 253.16 ff.
50 Cf. the criticism of Ebert (1991, pp. 46–47, 49) and the reaction of Runia (2000, pp. 107–109).
51 Taking a definition as middle term in a demonstrative syllogism is ‘entirely necessary’, as Proclus says
(In Tim. I.292.24). On definitions as middle terms in explanatory syllogisms see Arist. APo II 17 99a21
with Barnes (1994, p. 255).
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affected by them, but the faculty of judgment also knows their essences, because
it possesses their logoi; so in order to reveal the proper generated essence of
the objects of sense perception, he built the argument from the [term] doxaston.
(In Tim. I.292.26–I.293.5)
In this passage the awkward phrase “it obtains the position of the cause with respect to
them” is especially puzzling. Festugière (1966–1968, Vol. II, 143 n. 3) takes it to be a
repetition of the earlier point, that the doxaston becomes the middle term, and in that
sense the cause of the first demonstration, and sees doxa here as a slip for doxaston.52
But there is more to it than that. What we have here is no mere repetition of the formal
role of the term doxaston, but a statement regarding the epistemological role of the
faculty of doxa in the process of obtaining scientific knowledge of the perceptible
world. Proclus is drawing a parallel between the hierarchy of forms of cognition and
the ontological hierarchy. When he says that “doxa …obtains the position of the cause
with respect to the things that are generated”, he means that in the cognitive hierarchy,
doxa is the faculty that is on a parallel level to that of the proximate cause of everything
generated, i.e. Nature,53 in the ontological hierarchy:
For even as Nature possesses the power of creation of things of sense by having
reason-principles within it, and thus moulds and holds together the objects of
sense …so also that which possesses the power of knowing them on the gene-
ral level,54 by possessing beforehand the appropriate reason-principles contem-
plates their common properties. (In Parm 893.11–893.17, transl. Morrow and
Dillon)
In the same way as Nature possesses (creative) rational principles of the objects of
sense that it generates, the faculty of judgment has a prior conception of the principles
of those generated objects, but in a cognitive sense.55
It may be clear at this point that this Neoplatonic concept of doxa is a considerable
stretch from Plato’s view of it. A closer look is in order.
5.3 Doxa and perception
In the Platonic use the word for belief (doxa) traditionally has a negative ring, associa-
ted as it is with error, relativity, and non-existence. Proclus’ concept of doxa, however,
which is better translated ‘(faculty of) judgment’, is more optimistic and focuses on
its role in acquiring access to knowledge of the Forms.56
52 On middle term as cause in a syllogism, see Arist. APo I.2.71b22. See also Leunissen (2007).
53 Note that Nature is an ontological level distinct from the natural world, Martijn (2008, Ch. II).
54 Cf. Plato Theaet. 185–187.
55 Lautner (2002, pp. 262–263). Note that these principles are not derived from sense data (e.g. by abstrac-
tion). On this topic see Helmig (2008).
56 Lautner (2002, 258 ff). I think this is due to the fact that Proclus’ concept of doxa owes a lot to the rather
positive role doxa plays in the definition of knowledge as justified true belief given in the Theaetetus. The
traditional translation of doxa is ‘belief’, and that translation should, I think, be maintained in the context of
Plato’s philosophy. In a Proclian context, however, ‘belief’ has too subjective a ring. The root of doxa (dok-)
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For a Neoplatonist, all knowledge is ultimately innate, based on the soul’s viewing
of the Forms before incarnation. The knowledge resulting from this viewing takes
the shape of logoi, rational principles, in the soul, which are dormant until they are
awoken by some stimulus. In first instance, that stimulus comes from outside the soul,
and reminiscence is triggered by the perception of logoi, or rational structures, in the
material world that are similar to the logoi inherent in the soul.
Doxa, the lowest rational capacity of the soul, which touches upon the summit of
the irrational ones (In Tim. I.248.8–I.248.10, cf. III.286.30), is the faculty in which
the two meet. It possesses innate rational principles (logoi) and is thereby enabled
to identify immanent universals (logoi) in sense impressions, which are projections
of transcendent universals, by comparing them with its own logoi,57 and thus knows
the essence (ousia, In Tim. I.248.11–I.248.13, I.251.28) of the objects of sense per-
ception.58 This should not be understood in the sense that doxa “entitle[s] us to say
that the apple on the desk is the one I left in the basket yesterday” (Lautner 2002,
p. 258), i.e. that doxa is that which informs us merely regarding unity and identity
through time. In that case we would still not know that the object in question is an
apple. On the other hand, doxa is incapable of knowing the true nature of the individual
as this would involve giving a definition, knowledge of the ‘why’: there is no such
knowledge of individuals, and even if there were, doxa has no knowledge of causes
(cf. Lautner 2002, pp. 258–260). Somehow, doxa is able to subsume an individual
under a universal, without really knowing the universal, as that is the territory of
scientific knowledge (epistêmê).59
So what exactly is the role of this concept of doxa in the first demonstration? If
the definition of Becoming consisted only in ‘the generated is perceptible’, or more
precisely, if Becoming were accessible only to sense perception, then we would not
have been able to actually use the definition in any demonstrations, as we could not
have had any rational cognition of the perceptible, and would have merely experienced
it. It is the added accessibility to doxa (the fact that Becoming is doxaston) that provides
us with the possibility of correctly judging the sensory data: everything generated can
Footnote 56 continued
is indeed related to subjective experience of ‘being appeared to’, and doxa stands both for the resulting
conviction and for the faculty of the soul capable of developing such a conviction. But for Proclus doxa stands
primarily for a faculty of the soul that compares and matches sense impressions with innate logoi (see below).
Although ‘faculty of judgment’ has its own disadvantages as translation, as it suggests a Kantian Urteilskraft,
it is preferable to ‘belief’ and ‘opinion’ in expressing an aspect of critique as opposed to mere conviction.
57 These logoi are not derived (e.g. by abstraction) from sense data. Cf. In Alc. 250.5–250.18. In fact the
process primarily involves three logoi, namely the universal present in the sense perceptible, the logos in
the soul, and the so-called ‘later-born concept’, an image resulting from both, that originates in doxa as
a result of recollection triggered by perception. Cf. In Parm. IV 892.41 ff and 894.19–894.23 with Steel
(1997). For an extensive treatment of the ‘later-born concept’ see Helmig (2008).
58 In Tim. I.248.18–I.248.19; I.249.9–I.249.10; 251.5 ff; 293.3. Doxa is superior to the sensus communis,
as the latter “merely distinguishes the differences between the affections of the senses, but does not know
that the whole has a certain essence” (In Tim. I.249.21–I.249.22). On the sensus communis see Arist.
DA III 1, De memoria 1, 450a10 ff.
59 See e.g. In Remp. I 263.15 ff. Cf. Philop. In DA 4.6–4.7: doxa “knows the universal in the sensibles, as
well as the conclusions of discursive [arguments] (dianoêta)”, transl. De Haas, as quoted in Sorabji (2004,
p. 263). Cf. Plato Phaedr. 249B–249C on reminiscence and induction.
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be apprehended by judgment combined with sense perception, because we experience
it with our senses and identify the sensory data with our faculty of judgment. Thus it is
also doxa that identifies the essence of the perceptible as perceptible, and therefore as
generated: “so in order to reveal the proper generated essence of the objects of sense
perception, [Plato] built the argument from the [term] doxaston” (In Tim. I.293.5).
5.4 Doxa and logos: the second puzzle
Doxa alone, however, cannot do more than identify. It has no reasoning capacity. And
this brings us to the second puzzling remark involving doxa. It concerns what seems
a case of scholastic completeness. After discussing the definition of Being as ‘known
through intellect and reasoning’, and of Becoming as ‘grasped through perception and
unreasoning opinion’, Proclus introduces a class of things that is known through a
combination of logos (not to be confused with the abovementioned logoi) and doxa.60
Just as definitions of Being and of Becoming were given by describing our cognitive
access to them, it is possible to give a definition of the ‘intermediate’ (to meson)
between pure eternal Being and pure Becoming, from the point of view of cognition:
If, after setting aside that which is always Being only and that which is generated
only, you should wish to define what is intermediate as well, i.e. what is in a cer-
tain sense being and in a certain sense generated, by removing intellect from the
one of the two definitions and sense-perception from the other, you will produce
the definition of the intermediate. This, in fact, is what is knowable by reason
and judgment. (In Tim. I.257.14–I.257.19, transl. Runia, slightly modified)
We obtain cognition of the intermediate, or intermediate cognition, by coupling the
lower faculty of cognition associated with the higher realm of Being to the higher
faculty associated with the lower realm of Becoming. That is, the intermediate realm
is known or knowable by coupling logos to doxa.
On the face of it, this description is a scholastic filling out of the gap between two
extremes, in which case it is trivial. I propose, however, that Proclus introduces an
actual new level of cognition here, and one that is crucial to the scientific status of
physiologia. Two questions need to be addressed in order to bring out its significance.
First of all, what is the intermediate realm to which we have cognitive access through
logos and doxa? And secondly and more importantly, what is the epistemological
function of the combination of these two cognitive capacities, logos and doxa?
This is not the place to go into these questions in detail, so I will summarise my
answers to them.61 The intermediate realm is that of those things that are either both
Being and Becoming, or both Becoming and Being (there is a difference for Proclus),
which means that they are generated in some respect, and eternal in another. To this
60 In Tim. I.251.17–I.251.18, cf. Lautner (2002, p. 260).
61 For a more detailed answer see Martijn (2008, Ch. III).
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realm belong Time, Soul, and Nature (In Tim. I.256.30 ff), which also constitute some
of the main topics of Proclus’ physiologia.62
The next question, then, is which form of cognition it is that combines the faculties
of reasoning and judgment, and which function it has. Of course, the description logôi
kai doxêi gnôston (‘knowable by reason and judgment’) recalls a well known defi-
nition of knowledge, presented by Theaetetus (and rejected by Socrates as circular):
“I had forgotten a definition I have once heard someone give, but now it’s coming back
to me: he said that a true judgment accompanied by an account constitutes knowledge”
(tên meta logou alêthê doxan epistêmên einai, Theaet. 201C8 ff). This definition may
well have been Proclus’ inspiration,63 but I propose moreover that our commentator
takes the procedure applied in the Timaeus, and especially in the proœmium, to be
an instance of just such a combined application of doxa and logos. Doxa, which
primarily establishes the essence of the universe, but in general judges the data of
sense perception on the basis of her innate universal logoi, presents its judgments to
discursive reasoning (logos). Reasoning in turn uses these judgments in its demonstra-
tions, primarily in order to unveil the ‘why’, the causes of the universe. The scientific
conclusion regarding the essence of the world depends on the (true) judgment, based
on innate knowledge, that the world is perceptible, but the discursive rational method
inspired on the method of geometry develops it into syllogistic reasoning, and hence
scientific knowledge. Thus we have a cast-iron guarantee both of the knowability of
Becoming, and of the universality of the propositions of physiologia—which thereby
fulfils conditions 5 and 7 of the Model.
6 Conclusion
The upshot of this paper is twofold. First of all, by the case study of physiologia we
have illustrated Proclus’ idiosyncratic conception of science, which can be mapped
onto the Classical Model of Science, but is adapted to Neoplatonic metaphysics and
epistemology. And secondly, it has been shown how Proclus obtains the status of
scientific knowledge for physiologia through the use of the Model. In particular, he
structures the presentation of the basic concepts in a way that allows him to connect
rational and empirical physiologia. For this purpose, he creates a parallel between
the middle term of a syllogism and the intermediary role of the faculty of judgment.
As a result, physiologia starts from universal, necessary (in the ordo essendi and
cognoscendi), and known concepts and propositions.
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62 After the introductory first book of the In Tim., book II is devoted to the divine causes of the universe,
book III to body and soul of the universe, book IV is a treatment of time, and book V deals with the planets
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63 Proclus would not be held back by the fact that the logos in the Theaetetus is not the faculty of discursive
reasoning, but rather a rational account by way of justification of a true judgment.
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